-H.M.S. Hood Reference Materials-
ADM 234/509: H.M.S. Suffolk Operations 23-26 May 1941
Updated 08-Mar-2007

This document is a modern transcription of a portion of Admiralty record ADM 234/509. This particular portion covers H.M.S. Suffolk's involvement in the pursuit and sinking of the battleship Bismarck in May 1941. The original file is held at the The National Archives at Kew, London. This Crown Copyrighted material is reproduced here by kind permission of The National Archives.

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H.M.S. "SUFFOLK"- OPERATIONS 23rd MAY, 1941, TO 26th MAY, 1941

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From: The Commanding Officer, H.M.S. Suffolk
Date: 11th June 1941

Ref. No. 1706/006.

To: The Rear-Admiral Commanding, First Cruiser Squadron.


Report on operations against the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen is being rendered as follows: -


No. 1. Narrative
No. 2. Remarks
No. 3. Copy of previously signalled report.
No. 4. Signals made. (1)
No. 5. Recommendations for Awards. (1)
No. 6. Strategical Plot. (One copy only.)
No. 7. Tactical Plots. (2)

2. It is regretted that, owing to the ship having been continuously at sea on other operations since the above until 9th June, only Enclosures Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 are ready and are forwarded herewith.

The others will be forwarded as soon as possible.


(1) Not reproduced here.
(2) Not reproduced in this publication. The Tactical Plots were retained by the Rear-Admiral Commanding First Cruiser Squadron in connection with the report required by H.F. 01325/113 of 8th July, 1941.

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[Enclosure No. 1 to the Commanding Officer, H.M.S. "Suffolk's" No. 1706/006, dated 11th June, 1941.]

H.M.S. "SUFFOLK"- OPERATIONS 23rd MAY, 1941, TO 26th MAY, 1941
Narrative (1)

Friday, 23rd May, 1941

Period on Patrol

1. 1100 (B). Parted company from Norfolk to comply with C.S.1's 1008 (B)/23. Last fix (on land) at 1040 (B).

2. 1425 (B). Reached main edge of ice pack, 66° 50' N., 25° 34' W. Searched thence through position 67° 06' N., 24° 27' W., to 67° 12' N., 24° 26' W., the last six miles being through broken ice.

The main ice edge ran from 66° 50' N., 25° 34' W., through 67° 05' N., 24° 46' W., to 67° 13' N., 24° 51' W., and thence out of sight approximately 070° apparently clear of Q.Z.X. 366.

Note.- On 13th May the ice had drifted over most of Q.Z.X.366, breaking loose many mines of which over 70 were counted floating eastwards of the area in the next few days; but had since receded.

3. 1810 (B). Turned through south to 1900 (B) position 67° 02' N., 24° 38' W., and set course 240°, 18 knots, clear of the broken ice.

Adjusted arc of sweep of Type 284 as requisite to cover bearings on which visibility was below 8 miles. Type 279 kept listening watch but was not used for transmitting.

At 1915 (B) the arc of sweep was made Green 40° to Red 170°, there being mist between those bearings which, however, was tending to clear ahead and extend northwards.

Period from Sighting Enemy until 2359 (B)/23

Phase 1922 (B) to 2028 (B) . (Tactical Plot Diagram 1)

4. 1922 (B). Sighted Bismarck, followed by a large cruiser (Prinz Eugen), bearing 020° (Green 140°), 7 miles, course 240°; Suffolk's position 66° 59' N., 24° 51' W.

Made first sighting report on 210 kc/s, 8,290 kc/s, 500 kc/s and 138 kc/s.

5. 1923 (B). Full speed ahead; altered course to 150° to take cover in the mist, and to make for gap between Q.Z.X. 241 and Q.Z.X. 363 if unable to round Q.Z.X. 363 while keeping out of sight.

6. 1930 (B). Altered course to mean course 210°, and adjusted speed as requisite, to round the north-west end of Q.Z.X. 363 while keeping in the mist, which proved possible.

7. 1934 (B) to 2023 (B). Obtained Type 284 ranges and bearings as requisite. Those used for making deductions of enemy's position, course and speed are shown on the tactical plot.

Note.- The bearings shown on the tactical plot herewith have been corrected to "mid-bearings," though at the time those taken at 1944 and 1953 were actually "right cut-off bearings" and were plotted without correction to mid-bearing; the consequent error being 5° and 3° respectively. The 1934 and 2023 bearings were observed (accurate) mid-bearings, and reported and plotted as such.

(1) Paragraph number, not in the original, have been inserted

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The plot gave enemy's initial speed as 20 knots (period 1922-1934); and his speed by 1953 as 28 knots (period 1934-1953).

2000 (B). Having rounded Q.Z.X. 363, manoeuvred as requisite to work unseen on to enemy's port quarter.

2017 (B). Altered course 310° to steer out of the mist to sight the enemy.

Reports.- Made reports at 1922, 1934, 1948, 1957, 2024 and 2026 during the above phase; all except the 1922 (first-sighting) report being based on information from Type 284.

Phase 2028 (B) to 2258 (B). (Tactical Plot Diagrams II and III)

8. 2028 (B). Re-sighter enemy, bearing 265°, 10 miles; and at once hauled round through north and east to open the range and regain the mist.

2031 (B). Bismarck opened fire, possibly not at Suffolk.

2033 (B). Altered course to shadow from fine on the port quarter. Enemy was too close to the ice to be able to break back to starboard undetected.

9. 2043 (B). Emerged from the mist and reported the enemy in sight bearing 250°, 14 miles. Shadowed by sight from 15 miles to 18 miles distance, gradually working astern of an enemy whose mean course was now 220°, 28 knots.

10. 2152 (B). Enemy altered course to starboard in the edge of a distant rainstorm.

2154 (B). Enemy bearing 231° momentarily observed at inclination 0° or 180°, looking more like the latter. It was thought he might be abandoning his operation and steering back the way he had come.

Altered course at once to keep well ahead of enemy, should this be the case; intending to make for the gap between Q.Z.X.366 and the ice where, by use of gunfire and smoke and by simulating torpedo fire, the enemy might be diverted into the minefield.

2158 (B). As by 2158 the enemy had not emerged from the rainstorm, it was concluded that he had not reversed course but had resumed his previous course, and Suffolk altered course to 230° to continue shadowing from astern.

Enemy remained out of sight, in the rainstorm, until 2254.

Reports.- Made reports at 2046, 2116, 2129, 2152, 2209 and 2214 during the above phase.

Phase 2258 (B) to 2359 (B). (Tactical Plot Diagram IV)

11. 2258 (B). Re-sighted enemy bearing 232°, 18 miles (course 232°).

2258½ (B). Enemy firing, possibly at aircraft to northward, where occasional distant white smoke puffs had been appearing in the clear sky at intervals for some 40 minutes.

12. 2258 (B) to 2341 (B). No change; enemy being kept in sight. Plot showed enemy course and speed to be 230°, 28 knots.

2341 (B). Enemy bearing 232°, 18 miles. Enemy altered course 20° to port as he disappeared into some mist. (Reported.)

2343 (B). Enemy momentarily re-sighted bearing 230°, making white smoke.

2346 (B). Enemy momentarily re-sighted bearing 226°.

2350 (B). Very large puff of white smoke shot some 300 ft. into the air, bearing 221°; indicating when plotted that the enemy had altered course some 50° to port in all (not reported), but possibly now altering back to starboard.

2352 (B). Enemy momentarily re-sighted, steering 200°, 28 knots, and then disappeared into distant snowstorm. (Reported.)

Suffolk followed at 29½ knots to gain R.D/F contact.

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Norfolk approximately ten miles to port of Suffolk, out of sight (from her 2311 (B)/23).

Reports.- Made reports at 2258, 2306, 2341, 2349 and 2359 (B)/23, and at 0009 (B)/24, of events during above phase.

Saturday, 24th May, 1941

Phase 0001 (B) to 0321 (B). (Tactical Plot Diagrams IVA and V)

13. 0015 (B). Entered snowstorm; mean course 200°. Visibility until 0315 averaged one mile.

0028 (B). Suffolk's position 65° 39' N., 28° 01' W., course 200°, speed 29 ½ knots.

0037 (B). Altered course to 180° to avoid detached ice floes (these being an indication that the main edge of the ice pack was no far to leeward).

0053 (B). Resumed course 200°.

0113 (B). Altered course to 220° to close to within R.D/F (Type 284) range of the main edge of the ice, so as to preclude the enemy doubling back undetected to starboard, and also to move fine on to the enemy's starboard quarter, Norfolk being (from her position reports) to port.

0151 (B). Resumed course 200°.

14. 0246 (B). Type 284 gained contact with one ship.

0247 (B). One ship "right cut-off bearing" 180°, 19,200 yards; presumed from the range to be a battleship. (This bearing was initially plotted without correction to "mid-bearing," error 5°, bit was subsequently corrected before enemy course and speed deductions were made.)

0252 (B). Enemy "mid-bearing" 192°, 17,400 yards. Altered course and speed as requisite to open and maintain the range at ten miles, shadowing by Type 284.

15. 0256 (B). Type 284 gained contact with second ship. Both ships now presumed to be the enemy.

0257 (B). Enemy "mid-bearing" 192° , battleship 19,800 yards and cruiser 17,500 yards. Deduced course from plot 240°, 28 knots.

0315 (B). Visibility rapidly improving.

0319 (B). Enemy battleship "mid-bearing" 188°, range 24,000 yards, cruiser 185°, 22,500 yards. Deduced course 235°, 27½ knots (but reported 240°, 28 knots).

0321 (B). Sighted enemy bearing 185°, 12 miles, course 240°.

Reports.- Made reports at 0028, 0101, 0131, 0231, 0247, 0256, 0319 and 0321 during the above phase.

Phase 0321 (B) to 0550 (B). (Tactical Plot Diagrams V, VI and VII)

16. 0325 (B). Enemy appeared to be altering course to starboard, so circled to northward to open the range to 15 miles, and continued shadowing by sight from enemy's starboard quarter. (Norfolk known, and B.C.S. assumed to be to port of enemy).

Note.- During the turn at 0325 the wind, now force 6, carried away the securing gear of the controls of the only aircraft on board, which was on the catapult, causing damage necessitating extensive repairs which took some days to complete. The aircraft was thus wholly unserviceable at a time when it might have been of decisive value.

0330 (B). Appreciated that enemy's alteration of course at 0325 must have been a small one to port, not a large one to starboard, though appearances had at first suggested the latter. Enemy's new course proved from the plot to be 220°, 27½ knots.

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0332 (B). Set courses (200°-230°) and speed as requisite for shadowing from 15-16 miles on enemy's starboard quarter. Enemy sometimes obscured, but visibility gradually increasing.

0447 (B). Enemy bore 186°*, 15 miles, course 220°, speed 27-28 knots and bore 196° at 0456 (B).

0520 (B). Enemy bore 203°, 15 miles, possibly increasing speed; and shortly afterwards altered course 30° to port and then back to starboard.

17. 0542 (B). Received Norfolk's 0541 reporting sighting enemy, followed by Prince of Wales' 0537 and Hood's 0543. The mean of these placed the enemy some 280°, 14 miles from Suffolk's plot position, and sights obtained shortly afterwards confirmed this. As, however, the Battle Cruiser Squadron was now in touch with the enemy, no amending position report was made at this point.

Enemy appeared to be approaching, and in case he had reversed course at 0538 (being "turned" by the Battle Cruiser Squadron), Suffolk circled to keep northward of enemy. It was soon realised, however, that the enemy was not approaching, the appearance being due to mirage, which also explains the similar (false) appearances at 0325.

Reports.- Made reports at 0447, 0456, 0522, 0533 and 0538 during the above phase.

Phase 0550 (B) to 0851 (B)

18. 0550 (B). Suffolk's course 220°, 29 knots, following the enemy.

0553 (B). Heavy gun flashes bearing 185°. Half a minute later Bismarck opened fire to port.

0556½ (B). Prinz Eugen opened fire to port.

0559 (B). Hood blew up.

0600 (B). Enemy bore 208°.

0605 (B). Course and speed as requisite to keep on enemy's starboard quarter.

0612 (B). Firing ceased, except for some A.A. fire by Bismarck. During the action three hits were observed on Bismarck from the heavy ships' fire.

0615 (B) and 0616 (B). Enemy (bearing 210°) altered course to starboard.

19. 0616 (B). Although the plot showed the enemy to be outside gun range, Prinz Eugen appeared at this time to be closing (now realised probably due to mirage), and at the same time Type 284 reported an echo at range 19,000 yards while trained on the Prinz Eugen.

0619 (B). Opened fire (six broadsides) using Type 284 range (initially 19,400 yards).

0623 (B). Type 284 ranges started decreasing rapidly.

0624 (B). Type 284 range 12,400 yards.
Ceased fire as there was clearly something wrong.

A large aircraft had just been sighted closing the ship from the enemy's direction, which turned across the line of fire at about six miles distant at 0624½, and it was then appreciated that this aircraft (not showing I.F.F.) was the object on which Type 284 had been ranging while trained on the enemy.

0629 (B). Bismarck bore 206°, Prinz Eugen bore 208°, 18 miles, course 240°.

Enemy then appeared to be altering course. Circled to northward to maintain distance.

20. 0638 (B)-0734 (B). Course and speed as requisite for following enemy in general direction 210°, at 18 miles distance, and for working on to his starboard quarter, Norfolk being (from her reports) to port.

*Not 184° as incorrectly given in Suffolk's 0447.

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0734 (B). Enemy bore 186° ; Bismarck appearing to be on fire and losing fuel, which left a broad track for miles. Speed apparently 22 knots, later increasing to 26 knots.

0814 (B). Enemy making large alterations of course and emitting considerable smoke.

0837 (B). Bismarck bore 193°, 18 miles, Prinz Eugen 195°, 19 miles ; course 205°, 28 knots.

0851 (B). Adjusted plot to 0800 Reference Position received at 0832 from C.S. One, the transfer being 290°, 20½ miles.

Reports.- Made reports at 0629, 0756, 0757, 0814, 0819, 0824, 0826 and 0837 during above phase. The first two of the above contained minor errors (2-3 miles) in own position given.

Phase 0851 (B) to 1757 (B)

21. Continued shadowing from 15-20 miles on enemy's starboard quarter.

0909 (B). Enemy bore 202°, 20 miles, course 205°, speed 24 knots, making fairly frequent small turns.

1044 (B). Enemy bore 214°, 17 miles, course 215°, speed 24 knots, making good 220°, 22 knots.

1150 (B). Lost sight of enemy in decreasing visibility. Started Type 284 sweeping and proceeded to close the enemy and take up a position from which to detect any break away to starboard.

Norfolk's 1205, 1323, 1349 and 1514 showed she had the enemy still in sight, and that the enemy had turned south to 180°.

Adjusted plot to 1531 Reference Position from C.S. One ; transfer 226°, 11½ miles, at 1531 (Norfolk bearing 082°, 11 miles), pending receipt of amended signal ; and a further 271°, 4½ miles at 1711.

1609 (B). Type 284 reported contact, 140°, 21,000 yards, with one ship.

1616 (B). Type 284 reported contact with second ship.

1622 (B) - 1700 (B). Type 284 temporarily out of action. Visibility clearing from north-westward. Opened out distance from enemy.

1711 (B). Re-sighted both enemy ships right ahead.

1716 (B). Norfolk in sight bearing 076°, 12 miles.

1757 (B). Norfolk in sight bearing 075°, 10 miles, and Prince of Wales 077°.

Reports.- Made reports at 0909, 0932, 1016, 1029, 1037, 1044, 1045, 1213, 1609, 1616, 1642, 1712, 1716 and 1734 during above phase.

Phase 1757 (B) to 2359 (B)

22. 1803 (B). Enemy bearing 145°, 15 miles, course 190°, disappeared into mist, and a few minutes later white smoke to westward of that bearing was seen.

1834½ (B). Type 284, now sweeping, reported contact ahead at 20,400 yards.

1835 (B). Increased speed and altered course to eastward to open the range and to comply with C.S. One's 1823 (B), received at 1834.

Since 1803 the enemy had made good 235° (10 miles), apparently attempting, in the mist, to waylay Suffolk approaching from a clear direction.

23. 1839 (B). Sighted Bismarck bearing 190°, 10 miles, course 240°.

1841 (B). Bismarck opened fire.

1842 (B) - 1846 (B) and 1851 (B) - 1855 (B). Manoeuvred and made smoke as necessary to avoid gunfire and then to comply with C.S. One's 1823 (B), the nearest enemy salvo falling 100 yards short and right with one or two shots close enough to start rivets in an after W.T. compartment by under-water concussion.

Fired 9 broadsides in return- three to starboard, three to port and three to starboard, all spread for line ; the third of which straddled at G.R. 21,125 yards (Type 284, range 20,700 yards).

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Blast from "B" turret shattered all the glass and blew away parts of the flimsy covering fitted to the bridge in 1940 in lieu of the previous windscreens, so that the wind and spray now drive straight in over the coaming.

1856 (B). Prinz Eugen opened fire, which was returned with three broadsides at G.R. 27,500 - 28,900 yards.

24. 1900 (B). Continued shadowing enemy, who had resumes course 180° during the above engagement, while conformingly generally to C.S. One's movements, Bismarck being only occasionally visible, beyond the cruiser.

Suffolk was now on the enemy's port quarter, in consequence of the enemy's westward movement from 1805-1835 and of own subsequent manoeuvres.

2015 (B). Adjusted plot to 2000 reference position received at 2013 (B) from C.S. One. Transfer 193°, 11 miles.

2312 (B). From Type 279 contact (showing I.F.F.) reported to C.S. One Victorious' striking force approaching from 124° as friendly. (Distance 14 miles, aircraft flying low).

Reports.- Made reports at 1839, 1858, 1923, 1937, 1939, 2234 and 2327 ; reports by V/S to C.S. One only at 1909, 1921, 2205, 2217, 2233, 2327, 2330 and 2332, during above phase.

Sunday, 25th May, 1941

Phase 0001 (B) to 0600 (B)

25. 0007 (B). Enemy A.A. gun-flashes bearing 222° indicated that the air attacks on Bismarck had begun.

0014 (B) - 0018 (B). C.S. One hoisted "enemy in sight 212°" and"Open fire." Suffolk could not immediately identify the target, and then the A.D.P. reported a "merchant ship" in sight bearing 205°. Owing to the uncertainty, fire was not opened. (The bridge did not see this vessel).

26. 0112 (B). As dusk was coming on, proceeded ahead to gain R.D/F contact with the enemy, in accordance with C.S. One's 2145/24. Enemy's course now 160°.

Decision, which lay between simply closing the enemy's port quarter (as was done) and working round to his starboard quarter, was based on the Suffolk's being already 40° on the enemy's port quarter at 15 miles range,* upon uncertainty as to the visibility westward of the enemy against the light horizon, and upon the time factor.

27. 0124 (B). Type 284 detected one vessel bearing 215°, 21,000 yards.

0130 (B). A brief engagement took place between Prince of Wales (now following Suffolk) and the Prinz Eugen, bearing 210°, the latter having hauled over to port. The German's fire was from two turrets only and was a long way short. On his retiring, Type 284 lost contact.

0210 (B). Adjusted plot by the amount of the difference between Norfolk's reported 0122 (B) position and her visible position relative to Suffolk. Transfer 232°, 9½ miles.

0213 (B). Type 284 contact 195°, 22,000 yards.

0225 (B). Deduced enemy's course 160°, 20 knots.

0229 (B). Both ships "mid-bearing" 192°, 20,900 yards (cruiser) and 25,500 yards (battleship) respectively. Set course parallel to the enemy.

28. 0236 (B). Having established the enemy's position, course and speed, decided to resume zig-zagging in view of the lightness of the night and of own now comparatively moderate speed.

Night visibility at this time was about six miles.

*Wrongly reported to C.S. One as 20 miles at 0110.

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29. 0306 (B). Re-established Type 284 contact. No change.

Zig-zagged 30° out for ten minutes, and back, during which time Type 284 contact was lost.

30. 0326 (B) - 0401 (B). Searching towards enemy's last bearing, until it became certain he had either turned round to starboard and worked eastwards under the stern of the shadowers, or he had altered course south-westward to draw ahead and away.

This took rather long to conclude, partly because of the onset of fatigue (Suffolk have been steaming at considerable speed either in pilotage waters or following the enemy for four consecutive nights), and partly because night R.D/F tactics were still only experimental.

31. 0401 (B) - 0600 (B). Decided it was essential to search first towards likely enemy courses 180° to 200°, since failure to do so now would not be subsequently retrievable ; and acted accordingly, reporting the situation at 0401 (B) and 0441 (B) and confirming contact lost at 0505 (B).

Remainder of Sunday, 25th May, and Monday, 26th May, 1941

32. 0610 (B)/25. Having proposed a curve of search westwards at 0600, proceeded as ordered in C.S. One's 0605 to cover more westerly enemy courses.

1120 (B)/25. By 1100 had covered all enemy courses up to 220° at 22 knots, and was about to report these clear when Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet's 1047 (B)/25 was received.

Proceeded towards position ordered.

33. 1600 (B)/25. Not having yet located the enemy, decided to search towards the Faroes-Iceland passage rather than towards the French ports for the following reasons:-

(i) This would also cover Victorious, who had only 6 in. cruiser escort ; it being thought feasible for the enemy to send one or more 8 in. cruisers or "pocket battleships" (possibly with destroyers and minesweepers) to meet a retreating ship near the Faeroes. At that time there was no heavy British ship anywhere near that area.

(ii) There were considerable forces (including Force "H") better placed than Suffolk for intercepting retreat south-eastwards, but none except Victorious and escort and two 6 in. cruisers for intercepting or over-taking retreat north-eastwards.

(iii) Suffolk's long distance from the nearest possibly overtaking point south-eastwards.

1158 (B)/26. Concluded this operation and reversed course on receipt of Admiralty's 1015 (B)/26th May.


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[Enclosure No. 2 to the Commanding Officer, H.M.S. "Suffolk's" No. 1706/006, dated 11th June, 1941.]


Intentions and Reasons for Action Taken

These are indicated in the narrative, except the following:-

On Friday, 23rd May, afternoon, the atmospheric conditions were unusual, being clear over and close to the ice and misty between the ice and the land. Suffolk took advantage of this to move much further across the top of the minefield, in investigating the ice as ordered by C.S. One's 1008(B)/23/5, than would otherwise have been prudent.

2. The effect of mirage, making a hull-down ship occasionally appear hull above the horizon, will be noted. The appearance which it caused led me to two or three times into what was perhaps over-caution about maintaining distance. This would be undesirable unless at least two shadowers were present, as contact might easily be so lost.


3. Type 284 is used in preference to Type 279 for tactical range and bearing finding, since the limit of the R.B. Unit L.10 on Type 279 is only 14,000 yards, and its bearing discrimination is less precise. Also, there is less conflict between the calls of gunnery and tactics upon the Type 284 than there is between those of tactics and air lookout upon Type 279.

What is really wanted, however, is a separate tactical set, with a mast-head position ; of power sufficient to ensure R.D/F contact outside effective enemy gun range.

4. A separate report will be rendered on the technique evolved for accurate (± ½°) bearing finding, and for fixing the ship's position on the land.

Fixes at 15 miles, accurate to within one mile, have been regularly obtained off the steep-to and high coast of Iceland and landfall was made on Baccalieu Island and Cape St. Francis, Newfoundland, at 15 miles by this means when proceeding there to fuel after this operation, giving a precise fix.

5. The primary difficulty in R.D/F work on unseen objects is being sure of each object's identity. Constant and accurate plotting of successive contacts is essential (and this applies to Type 279 reports of aircraft, also) for identifying the respective movements of more than one object on similar bearings.

Its other principle limitation, especially for night work, is that its scan is not an all-round view but the view of a very limited arc, at any one moment. A nice balance between keeping contact with one object and sweeping round for others is necessary, but not easy to achieve. (For Type 284 sweep in Suffolk, 60° a minute has been found a suitable rate of sweep.)

6. The outstanding lesson learned from Suffolk's failure to maintain R.D/F contact on the early morning of 25th May is to keep (visibility permitting) at least 25 per cent. inside the extreme R.D/F range of the object being shadowed ; and to reduce own departure from a course and speed similar to the enemy's as much as possible.

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Enemy Interference with R.D/F and W/T

7. No interference with R.D/F or W/T was experienced at all during the operations.

8. On two occasions, 4½ hours and 20 minutes respectively, before encountering the enemy, there was a litter ephemeral interference on Type 279, taking the form of an interlaced or wavy line on the elliptical trace. The amplitude maxima were on bearing which were about at right-angles to the then probable direction of the enemy, and which pointed towards the W/T stations at Reykajavik and Bolungarvik. On the whole, I think this interference was internal, not external ; and even if external it is most unlikely to have had anything to do with Bismarck or Prinz Eugen.

Nothing similar occurred on Type 284 at any time.

Bridge and Air Defence Position

9. These positions in Suffolk are the worst I have known in any ship. A loss of up to 25 per cent efficiency of the bridge and look-out personnel occurs when steaming into the wind or sea, especially when officers and men are already fatigued.

A separate report will be rendered if, as I fear will be the case, the efforts now being made by the ship's staff to improve matters are not successful.