(Pages 3-8 of 'The Fighting Instructions')
CONTENTS
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Clause
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Subject
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1-10
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1
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2
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3
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4
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5-6
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7
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8-9
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10
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11-30
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11
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12-17
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18
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19
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20
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21
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22
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23-24
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25
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26-27
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28-29
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30
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31-34
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FIGHTING THE ENEMY
1. This can only be achieved by a strong offensive spirit and by
bold and correct tactical handling of the units engaged. Engagement
with a greatly superior force does not constitute sound tactics unless
there is some vital object to be achieved by so doing. Once in action,
Flag Officers and Captains should concentrate on pressing the enemy
and not be influenced by the possible damage their ships may receive.
INITIATIVE
2. The varying and unforeseen circumstances which always arise in
action demand the display of initiative by all concerned. Captains,
whenever they find themselves without specific directions during an
action or are faced with unforeseen circumstances which render previous
orders inapplicable, must act as their judgement dictates to further
their Admiral's wishes. Care should be taken when framing instructions,
that these are not of too rigid a nature.
MUTUAL SUPPORT
3. In the past the unfailing support given by one British ship to
another in battle has contributed largely to success in action. To-day
the same mutual support must be given and expected between all classes
of ships. The fact that it is often the duty of heavy ships to give
support to small ships should not be forgotten.
LOSS OF SHIPS
4. War at sea cannot be waged successfully without risking the loss
of ships. Before any specific operations can be undertaken, consideration
must be given to the losses that may be expected. Should the object
to be achieved justify a reasonable loss of ships, the fact that such
losses may occur should be no deterrent to the carrying out of the operation.
MAINTENANCE
OF TOUCH WITH THE ENEMY
5. It is the duty of any ship or aircraft which gains touch with
the enemy to retain it. Ships should not normally, however, expose themselves
to such disablement as would render them incapable of reporting the
enemy's movements. In the event of losing touch or being driven off,
endeavour should be made to regain touch as soon as possible.
6. Very good reasons should
exist before touch with an enemy is relinquished. If an order from a
Senior Officer is received, compliance with which will result in losing
touch with the enemy, the possibility of the authority concerned not
being in full possession of the facts must be considered.
ENEMY
REPORTS IN ACTION
7. It is vital for the success of any
operation that the Admiral should be kept fully informed of the movements
of the enemy and the development of the action. Nearly every incident
is seen by at least one ship or aircraft, but only a few can be observed
by the Admiral. Ships and aircraft should never assume that the Admiral
can see everything that they can see. When in doubt, it is better in
action to give too much information than too little.
ACTION
AT NIGHT
8. The essence of night fighting is
surprise followed by prompt action ; complete readiness is essential.
In any action at night, the primary object is to develop the maximum
volume of gun and torpedo fire before the enemy can do so, and all other
considerations are of secondary importance. Results at night will depend
on the action taken in the first minute or so, and if the most effective
action is not taken immediately it is unlikely that there will be time
to recover.
9.
Any tendency to assume that a vessel sighted at night is friendly is
both dangerous and unsound. It is an advantage in night operations if
the initial positions and ordered movements of friendly vessels can
be promulgated to all units, in order that vessels sighted unexpectedly
in the dark can normally be assumed to be hostile.
THE
USE OF W/T
10. W/T messages may be intercepted or D/F'ed by the enemy, so
putting him on his guard and giving him valuable information as to the
position of our forces. When in doubt in regard to making a signal by
W/T, Captains should balance the advantages to be gained by rapid communication
against the possible loss of surprise. The detailed instructions on
this matter are contained in the Signal Manual, Chapter XVII.
ADVANTAGE
OF SIGHTING THE ENEMY FIRST
11. In any action the initiative will be obtained by sighting
the enemy before being sighted. The advantage gained may be of short
duration, but this should be fully exploited by prompt action. At night
this may make the whole difference between being sunk and sinking the
enemy. Hence, every endeavour should be made, by day and night, to achieve
first sighting.
SELECTION OF A FAVOURABLE
TACTICAL POSITION
12. When the enemy has been located the Admiral will manoeuvre his
forces to obtain a good tactical position or force a bad one on the
enemy. The following are the factors which affect the choice of tactical
position ; their relative importance must vary with the circumstances.
13. Time. The time available,
in which to defeat the enemy before daylight fails, will always be of
the first importance.
14. Visibility. Visibility
and conditions of light may vary in different directions and areas.
A force that attains a position which enables its ships to have the
best sight of and to be the least obvious to the enemy, will gain an
advantage in conditions of differing visibility. The disadvantage of
having a setting sun behind the enemy has now been overcome by the introduction
of shades for spotting glasses and director sights ; once the sun is
below the horizon, gunfire is assisted while twilight lasts. The same
principle applies at dawn.
15. Dawn. When ships meet
at dawn, the advantage of light usually favours the ship to the westward.
If enemy ships are suspected of being in the vicinity and circumstances
permit, ships or units not already in touch can expect prior sighting
of any enemy units near them to the eastward, or can avoid being surprised
by enemy ships to the westward of them, by steaming at high speed to
the eastward from before first light.
16. Wind, sea and swell
(a) It is desirable to deploy in a direction
that will bring the wind nearly ahead.
(b) If gunnery requirements predominate, it is better to have
the wind on the engaged side so as to avoid interference from funnel
and cordite smoke.
(c) A wind on the disengaged side will enable full use to be
made of smoke for screening a retirement.
(d) The movements and gunfire of destroyers will be hampered
when attacking into a strong head wind or a heavy swell.
(e) For the operations of aircraft carriers it is usually better
to have the wind on the disengaged side ; this depends on the strength
of the wind.
17. The strategical situation
and the conduct of the enemy may, and in the majority of cases will,
be the overriding factors in bringing the enemy to action. In these
circumstances, any delay involved in improving the tactical position
will be unacceptable. The possibility of "fixing" an unwilling
or faster enemy by means of air striking force attacks must be constantly
borne in mind.
THE EFFECT OF DISPOSITION
AND FORMATION ON TACTICS
18. When two or more squadrons or ships come into range of the enemy,
all ships should open fire together. This can best be achieved by disposing
squadrons at right angles to the known or expected bearing of the enemy.
Ships in column should be formed on a line of bearing broad to the bearing
of the enemy ; this formation enables "A" arcs to be quickly
opened when ships turn together to the desired course.
CONCENTRATION
19. Opportunities for concentration may occur unexpectedly and must
be seized without delay. A tactical concentration of a stronger force
on a weaker should be the constant aim ; when obtained, it can be exploited
by a concentration of gunfire on the enemy.
RANGE AT WHICH TO FIGHT
20. There is always a best range at which to fight a given enemy
in given conditions. By day, the main considerations are the characteristics
of the opposing ships ; the effects of air-spotting and weather on gunfire
; and the tactical situation. In general, however, a short range should
be aimed at. At such a range the superior fighting qualities and stamina
of the British race should tell, as they have so often in the past.
It must be remembered that in closing the range an end-on target is
difficult to hit ; risk of damage from enemy gunfire will be reduced
if frequent small alterations of course are made, while steering towards
the enemy. At night, the best range is that at which ships can attack
the enemy effectively and unseen.
SPEED OF SHIPS WHEN FIGHTING
21. High speed is invaluable in gaining touch with the enemy. Once
an action starts, maintenance of full speed may no longer remain a tactical
necessity. An appropriate reduction in speed will often facilitate control
and so increase effectiveness of gunfire.
AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE
22. War experience has proven that is is unsound policy to refrain
from engaging enemy ships within gunrange, in order to husband ammunition
for a better opportunity later in the action. These opportunities seldom
recur. As a general rule, fire should be deliberate at extreme range
and maximum fire developed as soon as the enemy comes within effective
gun range. An exception may be made on those occasion when a ship is
able to close an enemy unseen.
USE OF SMOKE IN ACTION
23. In all forms of warfare, smoke screens have a psychological
effect ; they conceal an unknown threat which may result in a measure
of fear or anxiety on the part of the enemy. In particular situations
smoke also provides an additional weapon for both attack and defence.
On all occasions, however, when smoke is employed tactically two important
features must be remembered:-
(a) It is always difficult for the smoke-laying
unit to lay the smoke in the right place and at the moment desired
by a Senior Officer.
(b) Smoke when once laid is no longer under control.
24. While the immediate advantage to be
gained by using smoke should never be overlooked, it must not be forgotten
that, for the reasons given in (a) and (b) above, it may later prove
to be a disadvantage.
REPORTING ENEMY RECOGNITION
SIGNALS
25. A knowledge of the challenge and reply of other recognition
signals employed by the enemy will be of the greatest value in action.
Should any ship obtain such information, it should be passed at once
to the Admiral by cypher message. The fact of our challenge being compromised
by being made to a ship which afterwards proved hostile, should also
be reported unless this challenge will shortly be changed. However,
the above reports should not be made unless the Captain considers that
the use of W/T for this purpose is justified.
DISABLED BRITISH SHIPS
26. No disabled ship or ship whose ammunition is expended, should
leave her unit unless unable to keep station. If station cannot be maintained,
disabled ships should join any other ships similarly placed and continue
to follow the main force as far as their capabilities allow. They may
be of considerable value in the later stages of an action-for
example, for dealing with disabled enemy ships. Ships, which have expended
all their ammunition and torpedoes, will be available for towing disabled
vessels or for other after-action duties.
27. No ship is to be allowed to fall into
the hands of the enemy. When a ship has to be abandoned, the Captain
is held responsible that she does in fact sink, and he should not leave
the vicinity until this has been confirmed.
HELP FOR DAMAGED SHIPS AND
AIRCRAFT
28. When cruising, no capital ship, aircraft carrier or cruiser
should go to the assistance of any ship that has been torpedoed or mined
without a direct order from the Admiral, or until adequate precautions
against submarines and mines have been taken. Destroyers should not
use high speed when proceeding to the assistance of vessels believed
to have been mined, but should proceed with cautions.
29. No ship engaged with the enemy is to
break off action to go to the assistance of a damaged ship or aircraft,
without a direct order from a Senior Officer.
RESCUE OF AIRCRAFT PERSONNEL
30. The personnel of aircraft forced down in the sea should be rescued
by destroyers or smaller vessels. Cruisers and larger ships are not
to stop to rescue aircraft crews, but they may drop a provisioned boat
or carley raft if not in action and unless enemy submarines are known
to be in the vicinity.
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