(Pages 102-104)
GENERAL
590. When an area under our control is threatened
or attacked by enemy light forces, confusion and failure will ensue unless
all forces in the area work to a pre-arranged plan.
COMPOSITION OF COUNTER-ATTACKING FORCES
591. Small cruisers or destroyers are the most suitable
vessels with which to form counter-attacking forces for despatch to the
area. The ideal unit is a division. Co-operation between all ships is
particularly important in this form of action ; whenever possible the
unit should consist of ships which have previously worked together.
SEPARATE AREAS OF OPERATIONS
592. The general principle of all night fighting
that any ship sighted is known to be an enemy, particularly applies to
counter-attacking at night. Each unit must therefore be given a separate
area inside which no other friendly units may normally patrol. Smaller
vessles previously on patrol in the area should be withdrawn or, if this
is not possible, ordered to retire in a give direction when an enemy report
is received.
REPORTS OF ENEMY MOVEMENTS
593. A knowledge of the enemy's movements is vital
to success at night. Accuracy in receiving as well as in making enemy
reports is of great importance.
ACTION ON RECEIPT OF AN ENEMY REPORT
594. Counter-attacking forces should be ordered
to raise steam and proceed as units to their allotted areas without delay.
Their action on arrival in their areas of operation will depend on the
reported positions of the enemy. If gunfire, starshell or searchlights
are seen in an area in which another counter-attacking unit is known to
be, counter-attacking forces should not proceed to its assistance
unless identification lights are shown by the opposing forces, which leaves
no doubt as to which is friend or foe. A signal should be made ordering
identification lights to be switched on, if none are showing. However,
a unit already in action with the enemy may leave its area in order to
continue the engagement.
ACTION ON SIGHTING THE ENEMY
595. The action to be taken on sighting the enemy
should be determined before contact is made. Unless the enemy is sighted
on a parellel and similar course, there is a risk of touch being lost
in the darkness. If the enemy is on an opposite course it will usually
be best to fire torpedoes and then turn to close the enemy at full speed,
in order to continue the engagement.
596. Both guns and torpedoes should be used
but the latter is the more effective weapon as it is difficult to sink
a ship by gunfire, even at short range, in an engagement lasting a very
short time. The ram is invaluable at night in an action close to our own
base and no opportunity to use it should be missed.
ACTION WHEN TOUCH IS LOST
597. If forces become scattered in the confusion
of action, and touch is lost, immediate steps should be taken to regain
touch with the enemy and continue the action. The Senior Officer present
should order all units in his vicinity to spread and carry out a search.
In order to avoid delay W/T and visual signalling methods should be used
freely. At such a time security is less important than ensuring that all
friendly forces at sea are informed of the action intended, and that the
enemy is located once more.
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